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Résumé / Abstract
Résumé :
Nous developpons dans cet article quelques jalons d'une
économie politique de la politique environnementale. Nous réexaminons
le consensus des économistes en faveur de mécanismes sophistiqués de
réglementation incitative. Nous insérons tout d'abord la question du choix
des instruments dans le cadre général de la construction de mécanismes et
nous développons une économie politique à partir d'une analyse de contrats
incomplets. Ensuite, nous montrons dans divers contextes pourquoi des
contraintes *constitutionnelles+ sur le choix des instruments de politique
environnementale peuvent être désirables malgré leur apparente
inefficacité économique. Leur justification réside dans les limites qu'elles
imposent à la capacité des politiciens de distribuer des rentes. Nos résultats
permettent de mieux comprendre l'émergence récente de mécanismes
incitatifs en réglementation environnementale.
Mots clés : Environnement, Économie politique, Théorie politique, Choix
d'instruments
Partition du Journal of Economic Literature : D6, H1, L5, Q2
Abstract :
This paper makes some steps toward a formal political
economy of environmental policy. Economists' quasi-unanimous
preferences for sophisticated incentive regulation is reconsidered. First,
we recast the question of instrument choice in the general mechanism
literature and provide an incomplete contract approach to political
economy. Then, in various settings, we show why "constitutional"
constraints on the instruments of environmental policy may be desirable,
even though they appear inefficient from a purely standard economic
viewpoint. Their justification lies in the limitations they impose on the
politicians' ability to distribute rents. Some insights are then provided
into the question often raised regarding the recent emergence of
incentive mechanisms in environmental regulation.
Keywords : Environment, Political Economy, Political Theory, Choice of
Instruments
Journal of Economic Literature Classification numbers : D6, H1, L5, Q2
1 INTRODUCTION
A large number of instruments have been considered to regulate polluting
activities - Pigouvian taxes, quotas, depollution subsidies, marketable emis-
sion permits,
1
deposit refund systems,
2
assignments of legal liabilities,
3
etc.
As a result, the choice of policy instruments has become one of the major
questions debated in environmental economics.
4
Most of the discussion has
taken place within the benevolent social maximizer paradigm. But, start-
ing with Buchanan and Tullock (1975), the necessity of looking for political
economy explanations of the choice of instruments has been recognized.
5
However, dissatisfaction remains:
 \There is yet no satisfactory theory about the emergence of incentive
based mechanisms." Hahn (1990)
 \The development of a positive theory of instrument choice in envi-
ronmental regulation continues to elude researchers." Lewis (1995)
The purpose of this paper is to use and extend the methodology devel-
oped in Laont (1995) to provide some preliminary steps in the construc-
tion of a formal political economy of environmental economics. Economists'
general preferences for sophisticated incentive mechanisms is reconsidered.
Our political economy approach characterizes those situations where nely
tuned market based instruments are appropriate and situations where they
are dominated by cruder instruments.
In section 2, we recast the question of instrument choice in the gen-
eral mechanism design literature and we explain why the comparison of
instruments requires an incomplete contract setting, that is, a framework
where the constitutional design of policies is constrained by various im-
perfections.The ineciencies of the political game will appear as just one
particular constraint of the constitutional regulator.
1
Crocker (1966) and Dales (1968a, 1968b) rst proposed marketing emission permits.
2
See Bohm (1981).
3
See Boyer and Laont (1995a, 1995b).
4
Cropper and Oates (1992) devote a large part of their survey to this question. The
recent survey by Lewis (1995) is entitled \Instruments of Choice for Environmental
Protection."
5
Beyond the debate about the Buchanan-Tullock paper (Yohe (1976), Dewees (1983),
Coelho (1976)), see also Boyer (1979), Noll (1983), McCubbins, Noll and Weingast (1989),
Hahn (1990), Hahn and McGartland (1989).
1
Section 3 develops models showing why constitutional constraints on the
instruments of environmental policy may be desirable, even though they ap-
pear inecient from a strict economic point of view. Their justication lies
in the limitations they impose on the politicians' ability to distribute rents.
6
First, we consider, in a simple majority vote political game, the choice be-
tween two regulation approach: on the one hand, the (incentive) regulation
of pollution delegated to the politicians (beneting from their detailed in-
formation about the economy { here the social cost of public funds { but
suering from their private agendas) and, on the other hand, cruder mecha-
nisms of regulation which can be imposed under a benevolent constitution.
Second, we reconsider the same model where the choice of mechanisms must
be delegated to politicians (again because it benets from their information)
but where the constitution can choose between requesting from politicians
to select non-discriminatory quotas, that is, pooling mechanisms, or open-
ing the possibility for politicians of selecting powerful incentive mechanisms.
Third, we compare political discrimination with a (pooling) quota policy de-
signed at the constitutional level. These models provide some insights into
the question raised by Hahn (1990) of the recent emergence of sophisticated
incentive mechanisms in environmental regulation.
Section 4 studies how the outcome of this constitutional design of con-
straints on instruments is aected by the dynamics of reelections. We assume
that when a majority pursues excessively its private agenda, it generates a
negative impact on its reelection probability.
Section 5 extends the model to a situation where two types of interest
groups, producers and environmentalists, may benet from the capture of
the government through the size of informational rents that the regulation
mechanisms leave them. The distortions due to the political process are
studied in this more general model, as well as the impact of a dynamics
of reelection based on campaign contributions and the comparison of in-
struments is extended to this case. Concluding comments are gathered in
Section 6.
6
Rents appear when the net benets that an individual or a rm receives from partici-
pating to an activity are larger than the minimum level necessary to secure the participa-
tion of that individual or rm to the activity. Maloney and McCormick (1982) emphasized
that input and output restrictions associated with environmental policy create rents for
rms. A dierent but related argument is developed by Alesina and Rosenthal (1994) who
claim that voters take advantage of the separation of powers in the U.S. government (a
form of constitutional restrictions!) because they tend to dislike the somewhat extreme
ideologies of the two major parties.
2
2 THE POSITIVE THEORYOF INSTRUMENT
CHOICE: AN EXERCISE IN INCOMPLETE
CONTRACTING
Incomplete information is by now well understood as being a major obstacle
to rst best ecient regulation. Starting with Loeb and Magat (1979), regu-
lation of natural monopolies has been modeled as a principal-agent problem.
When contracting is unconstrained, the Revelation Principle
7
then states
that any type of regulation is equivalent to a revelation mechanism. In
such a revelation mechanism, agents communicate truthfully their private
information to the regulator who then recommends proper actions. The
requirement of incentive compatibility puts constraints on the actions that
can be implemented.
It is only recently that this framework has been extensively developed
for environmental economics.
8
A revelation mechanism can be viewed as a
command and control instrument and nevertheless it is clearly optimal here:
once an optimal revelation mechanism has been obtained, the question of
its implementation by various economic instruments or institutions, such as
regulatory proceedings, taxes and markets, arises but by denition those in-
stitutions implement then the same allocations as the command and control
approach. (See Laont (1994) for an example).
In such a framework the question of instrument choice is empty. Such
a question often arose in the literature because authors were not care-
ful enough in dening their instruments. For example, Yohe (1976) cor-
rectly shows that the alleged dierence between quotas and price controls
in Buchanan and Tullock (1975) disappears when instruments are appropri-
ately dened. He writes: \When the equivalent quantity control is properly
specied, both the economist's general preference for taxation and the reg-
ulatee's general preference for quotas will disappear."
Two types of meaningful comparisons of instruments are then possible.
Either one considers constraints on instruments (and the analysis should
explain the origin of these constraints) and various constrained instruments
can be compared. This is the essence of Weitzman's (1974) comparison
of prices and quantities in a situation where asymmetric information calls
7
See Baron and Myerson (1982), Guesnerie and Laont (1984).
8
See Baron (1985a), Laont (1994) and Lewis (1995). Early applications were essen-
tially reinterpreting Groves mechanisms by treating environmental externalities like public
goods (see for example Dasgupta, Hammond and Maskin (1980)).
3
for non-linear prices as optimal instruments, as Roberts and Spence (1976)
pointed out. Another example is the case of non-convexities due to neg-
ative externalities (Starrett (1972), Baumol and Bradford (1972)). There,
quotas are equivalent to non-linear taxes. Pigouvian (linear) taxes are then
dominated by quotas. Similarly, taxes and subsidies which are equivalent
when they are accompanied with appropriate lump sum transfers dier in
their absence with respect to the long run, entry-exit decisions of rms (see
Kamien, Schwartz and Dolbear (1966), Bramhall and Mills (1966), Kneese
and Bower (1968), and Dewees and Sims (1976)).
Or, one considers instruments which could be equivalent in the complete
contracting framework and one introduces imperfections elsewhere in the
economy that cannot be corrected by the regulator (then a good explana-
tion of this inability of the regulator must be given). This is the case in
Buchanan's (1969) example of a polluting monopolist when the subsidies
required to correct the monopolistic behavior are not available. Then, the
Pigouvian tax is clearly dominated by a quota which implements the second
best tax (devised for example by Lee (1975) and Barnett (1980)) and which
depends on the rm's market power. A more sophisticated analysis would
recognize that the control of the monopolist is conducted by a regulator
dierent from the regulator of the environment and would cast the analysis
in a multiprincipal framework.
A systematic analysis of instrument choice should then be conducted in
well dened second best frameworks, which are all methodological shortcuts
of an incomplete contract analysis. Constraints such as limited commit-
ment, renegotiation-proof commitment, collusion, favoritism, multiprinci-
pal structures
9
should be considered. Political economy constraints can be
viewed also as a special case of this methodology. The lack of nely-tuned
constitutional control of the politicians (the incomplete contract feature)
who have then private agendas introduces ineciencies in the regulatory
decision process. It then may become desirable to impose constraints on
politicians which favor particular instruments or to force the use of appar-
ently crude instruments.
In the next sections we develop political economy models aimed at pro-
viding positive explanations of instrument choice under alternative consti-
tutional controls.
9
See Baron (1985b) for an early study of the distortions due to the uncoordinated
activities of two regulators.
4
3 DISCRETIONAND FLEXIBILITY: THE EMER-
GENCE OF INCENTIVE REGULATION
3.1 The Basic Model
We consider a natural monopoly which is delegated the realization of a
public project which has social value S and costs  (K   d) where K is
a constant,  is a cost characteristic which is private information of the
rm (with  2 f; g and  =    ) and d is the level of pollution
accompanying the completion of the project. The lower the pollution, the
higher the cost for the monopoly. The social disutility of pollution is V (d)
(with V
0
> 0; V
00
> 0). Let t be the compensatory monetary transfer from
the regulator to the rm which has a utility level
U = t   (K   d) :
If 1 + ,  > 0, is the social cost of public funds due to the need for using
distortionary taxation to raise public funds,
10
the consumers' welfare is
C = S   V (d)  (1 + ) t:
The utilitarian social welfare is then
W = C + U = S   V (d)  (1 + ) (K   d)  U:
We assume that S is large enough to make the realization of the project
always desirable. Under complete information, the benevolent regulation
would set V
0
(d) = (1 + ) for each value of  and t =  (K   d) to nullify
the socially costly rent of the rm.
3.2 Social Pooling versus Political Discrimination
Suppose now that there is incomplete information about  and that  =
Prob( = ) is common knowledge. We consider rst the situation where
 is a random variable whose distribution is common knowledge but whose
value is observed by the government (the majority in power) only and cannot
be made veriable by a court. At the constitutional level, the choice is then
between imposing a regulation mechanism which maximizes expected social
10
The value of  is non-negligible and considered to be of the order of 0.3 in developed
countries and higher in developing ones. See Jones, Tandon and Vogelsang (1990, chapter
3) for a recent review of the empirical evidence.
5
welfare on the basis of E, the expected value of , or delegating to the
political majority the choice of regulation which will then be a function of
the value of  in which case the choice of pollution regulation will reect
private agendas.
We have a continuum [0; 1] of agents in the economy. Let  be a random
variable, drawn independently each period, taking the value 

2 (
1
2
; 1) with
probability
1
2
and 1   

with probability
1
2
;  represents each period the
measure of consumers who do not share the rm's rent (type 1 agents) and
1    is the measure of those who share the rent (type 2 agents). When
 = 

, majority 1 is in power and this majority, of measure 

, does not
benet from the rm's rent; when  = 1   

, majority 2 is in power in
which case the measure of type 2 agents who share the rm's rent is 

.
Accordingly, if  = 

, we have majority 1 which maximizes the welfare
of type 1 agents, namely


(S   V (d)  (1 + ) t) = 

(S   V (d)  (1 + ) (K   d)  (1 + )U) ;
thus overestimating the social cost of the rm's rent (1 +  > ). This
formulation presumes that the funding of rms through indirect taxation
is uniformly spread across all agents. Similarly, if  = 1   

, majority 2
maximizes


(S   V (d)  (1 + ) t)+U = 


S   V (d)  (1 + ) (K   d) 

1 +  
1



U

;
thus underestimating the social cost of the rm's rent (1 +   1= < ).
Under incomplete information about , the rm's individual rationality
and incentive compatibility constraints must be taken into account. We
know that only the type- rm will receive a rent that is equal to
U = 

K   d

;
where d is the pollution level requested by the discriminatory regulation
mechanism

(t; d); (t; d)

from the type- rm.
11
11
See Laont and Tirole (1993). The rm of type  can always pretend to be of type 
and realize the project with a pollution level of d at a cost of (K d); since it is entitled
to a transfer t(K   d  (K   d), it realizes a prot (rent) of at least (   )(K   d)
which must then be a lower bound on its prot when it acts according to its real type.
6
Then, majority 1 (when  = 

) solves:
max
(d;d)
W
M1;D
(d; d) = 

h


S   V (d)  (1 + )(K   d)  (1 + )(K   d)

+(1  )

S   V (d)  (1 + )(K   d)
i
:
Hence
V
0
(d
1
) = (1 + );
V
0
(d
1
) = (1 + ) + (1 + )

1  
: (1)
The values of d
1
and d
1
thus depend on . Majority 2 (when  = 1  

),
when it is in power, solves:
max
(d;d)
W
M2;D
(d; d) = 




S   V (d)  (1 + )(K   d)  (1 +  
1


)(K   d)

+ (1  )

S   V (d)  (1 + )(K   d)
i
:
Hence
V
0
(d
2
) = (1 + )
V
0
(d
2
) = (1 + ) + (1 +  
1


)

1  
: (2)
Again, the values of d
2
and d
2
depend on .
These results can be contrasted with the outcome of the maximization
of expected social welfare
max
(d;d)
W
D
(d; d) =
h


S   V (d)  (1 + )(K   d)  (K   d)

+ (1  )

S   V (d)  (1 + )(K   d)
i
:
with the same informational constraints which yields:
V
0
(d

) = (1 + )
V
0
(d

) = (1 + ) + 

1  
: (3)
The pollution level assigned to or requested from the type- rm is always
optimal, but that of the -type rm is either too large (under a majority
1 government) or too low (under a majority 2 government): d
1
> d

> d
2
.
7
These apparently surprising distortions need some explanations. Since both
majorities take into account the negative externality of pollution, they dier
only in their treatment of the informational rent. Majority 1 overvalues the
social cost of the rm's informational rent [it uses a weight of (1+) instead
of ]. For that majority, the cost of inducing abatement is larger than
its social cost because of the unavoidable informational rent and therefore
majority 1's regulation leads to a larger than optimal level of pollution from
the -type. Majority 2 undervalues the social cost of the rm's informational
rent [it uses a weight of (1 +    1=

) < ]. For that majority, the cost
of inducing abatement is therefore smaller than its social cost because its
members share the informational rent. Therefore majority 2's regulation
leads to a smaller than optimal level of pollution from the -type.
The gain from political delegation comes through the dependence of
d on . The cost of such delegation is the excessive uctuation around
d

(): Alternatively, the constitutional regulator may impose the pooling
mechanism ((t
p
; d
p
); (t
p
; d
p
)) which depends on  and the expected value of
 but not on any particular value of  and therefore not on the majority in
power. Hence the maximization program:
max
(d;d)
W
P
(d; d) =
h


S   V (d)  (1 +E)(K   d)  (E)(K   d)

+ (1  )

S   V (d)  (1 +E)(K   d)
i
yielding
V
0
(d
p
) = (1 +E)
V
0
(d
p
) = (1 +E) + (E)

1  
: (4)
The pollution levels d
p
and d
p
now depend only on E.
The emergence of the rather sophisticated incentive mechanism which
depends on  hinges on its ex ante comparison with the \pooling" mechanism
obtained above. We will carry out this comparison for small asymmetries
of information represented by . First, we observe that for  = , the
linearity of the problem in  implies that both mechanisms implement the
same pollution level d
0
. We compare the two mechanisms by computing the
second derivatives
12
of expected social welfare with respect to  at  = .
For the \pooling" mechanism (and  =
1
2
) we obtain in particular (see
12
The rst derivatives with respect to  evaluated at  =  are negative and equal.
8
Appendix 1):
d
2
W
P
d
2





=
= [
1
2
+ 2E+ 2(E)
2
]
1
V
00
(d
0
)
:
For the case of \political discrimination", we obtain (assuming that each
majority is in power half the time) the expected social welfare E

W
D
E

W
D
=
1
2
E

W
D
1
(d
1
; d
1
) +
1
2
E

W
D
2
(d
2
; d
2
)
where W
D
m
(; ) is the social welfare when majoritym decides, that is, simply
W
D
(d
m
; d
m
). Therefore (assuming  =
1
2
)
d
2
E

W
D
d
2





=
= [
1
(2

)
2
(2

  1) + 2E+ 2(E)
2
+ 2V ar()]
1
V
00
(d
0
)
:
More generally, the comparison between W
P
and E

W
D
can be summa-
rized in:
Proposition 1: For  close to , there exists a function v

(; 

),
v

(; 

) = 
2
 

2
   +
1
2

2
!
> 0
increasing in  and decreasing in 

, such that for V ar() > v

(; 

),
E

W
D
is larger than W
P
, that is, political discrimination [letting each
majority choose a discriminatory mechanism with the pollution levels de-
pending on ] is better than social pooling [determining a unique discrimi-
natory mechanism (d
p
; d
p
) irrespective of the value of  and therefore valid
for both majorities].
(see Appendix 1 for a proof).
For V ar() = 0, social pooling is optimal and dominates political dis-
crimination when  is close to . Indeed, discrimination on the basis of 
has then no value. But as V ar() increases, the value of adjusting policies
to the realized value of  increases and therefore it becomes better to leave
political majorities greater latitude in setting policies. A larger 

(above
1
2
by assumption) also favors political discrimination for a given V ar(). This
is because as 

increases, the dierence between the objective functions
of the majorities and the social welfare function decreases (the dierence
9
is maximal for 

=
1
2
). On the contrary, a larger  favors pooling, be-
cause it makes more likely the existence of rents and the cost of political
discrimination is related to excessive variations in those rents.
In this context, the emergence of sophisticated incentive mechanisms
would arise from a greater variability of the social opportunity cost of public
funds (larger variance of ), stronger majorities (larger 

) and a higher
probability of type- rms (smaller ).
Finally, we may wonder if the constitutional reform of moving toward
an incentive mechanism may emerge from unanimous ex ante consent and
not simply by appealing to ex ante social welfare maximization. For this
purpose we can compare ex ante the per capita welfare of the two types of
agents. We obtain:
Proposition 2 : For  close to , type 1 agents prefer political discrimination
[as dened in Proposition 1] over social pooling [as dened in Proposition 1]
i
V ar() > v
1
(; 

)  
2
 
1
2
  
2

2
!
< v

(; 

)
while type 2 agents prefer political discrimination i
V ar() > v
2
(; 

)  
2
 
2

  
2
 
1
2

2
!
> v

(; 

) :
(see Appendix 1 for a proof).
In this context, environmentalists would be here more active proponents
of incentive regulation than producers. If unanimous approval is needed for
constitutional reform in favor of discriminatory mechanism, it will happen
less often than socially desirable because v
1
(; 

) < v

(; ) < v
2
(; 

).
3.3 Simpler Constitutional Rules
We consider now the case of a pooling mechanism over  rather than over
. Each majority can only select a single quota level (as a function of ),
not a menu of quotas. Accordingly, we will compare the large political
discrimination allowed in section 3.2 (that we interpreted as a sophisticated
incentive regulation) with the constitutional rule that lets the politicians
choose the mechanism as a function of , but impose a pooling mechanism
in , typically a simple command and control mechanism.
If type 1 agents have the majority they solve
max
d
W
M1;P
= 

[S   V (d)  (1 + )E(K   d)  (1 + )(K   d)]
10
yielding
V
0
(d
1
) = (1 + )E + (1 + ) : (5)
Similarly, majority 2 solves
max
d
W
M2;P
= 

[S V (d)  (1+)E(K d) (1+ 
1


)(K d)]
yielding
V
0
(d
2
) = (1 + )E+ (1 +  
1


): (6)
Therefore, we obtain a social welfare level given by (assuming that each
majority is in power half the time):
W
P
=
1
2
W
P
1
(d
1
) +
1
2
W
P
2
(d
2
)
=
1
2
[S   V (d
1
)  (1 + )E(K   d
1
)(K   d
1
)]
+
1
2
[S   V (d
2
)  (1 + )E(K   d
2
)(K   d
2
)]
where W
P
m
() is the social welfare when majority m 2 f1; 2g decides. Com-
paring E

W
P
and E

W
D
, we obtain:
Proposition 3: For  close enough to , we have E

W
P
> E

W
D
, that is,
the pooling mechanism selected by majorities [a single non-discriminatory
(valid for all ) pollution level chosen by the majorities as a function of 
and of their private agendas] dominates the incentive mechanism chosen by
the majorities [letting each majority choose discriminatory (function of )
pollution levels as a function of  and of their private agendas] i
H(; 

; E; V ar())  
2
 


 
1
2

2
!
+1 2+2(1 )E+(E)
2
+V ar() < 0:
(See Appendix 2 for a proof).
For quadratic V () functions, the social welfare values are all quadratic
in . We can derive then the global superiority of the pooling mechanism
or the discriminatory mechanism from Proposition 3 and the fact that all
welfare levels coincide at  = . However, for more general V () functions,
the increase in , which is favorable to the discriminatory mechanism, may
lead to the superiority of the discriminatory mechanism when H() < 0, that
is when the pooling mechanism dominates for small . [See Figure 1A and
1B for examples].
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[Figure 1A here]
[Figure 1B here]
In this context, the emergence of sophisticated incentive mechanisms
would be associated with increases in , the dierential eciency of the
rms, that is the importance of the asymmetric information. From H(), it
is also associated with increases in E, in V ar(), in 

and with decreases
in .
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3.4 Quotas versus Discretion
We assume now that  is commonly known and that the constitution may
impose a single quota of pollution independent of the information about 
and common to both majorities. Maximizing the ex ante social welfare, we
obtain:
W
P
(d) = S   V (d)  (1 + )E(K   d)  (K   d)
yielding
V
0
(d
p
) = (1 + )E + : (7)
Proposition 4 : For  close enough to , the pooling mechanism [a pollution
level function of  but independent of  and the majority in power] dominates
political discrimination i
1 
1

E

(1 +   )
2
>


 
1
2

2
: (8)
[See Appendix 2 for a proof]
For small , the lack of exibility due to pooling may be less damaging
than the excessive discrimination imposed by political majorities and the
more so that 

is close to
1
2
, E is small, V ar() is small and  is large.
We can expect that political discrimination will become more valuable as
 increases for parameter values such that pooling dominates when  is
small enough, that is, for which (8) is satised [See Figure 2 for an example].
[Figure 2 here]
In this context, the emergence of sophisticated incentive mechanisms
would again be associated with increases in , the dierential eciency
of the rms, that is the importance of the asymmetric information. From
(8), it is also associated with increases in E, in V ar(), in 

and with
decreases in .
13
The function H() is increasing with E, V ar() and 

but decreasing with .
12
4 THE EFFECT OF REELECTION CONSTRAINTS
ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICE OF
INSTRUMENTS
As a short cut to a full dynamic model, we will consider a two period model.
Period 2 is analogous to the single period of the previous section and each
majority exploits to the full extent possible its power to pursue its private
agenda. However, in period 1, the majorities take account of the fact that
an excessive pursuit of their private interests decreases their probability of
reelection in period 2. In the case of political discrimination of section 3.2,
we will assume that the probability of reelection of majority 1 depends on
the dierence between the impact of its policies (d; d) and those which would
maximize social welfare (d

; d

), that is
14
1
2
 
k
2
(d  d

)
2
where d

is given by (3). When in power, majority 1 ponders in period 1 the
pursuit of its period 1 gain and the gains from being reelected next period.
Therefore, it maximizes over (d; d) the following per capita welfare function
of type 1 agents
W
M1;D
(d; d) + 

1
2
 
k
2
(d  d

)
2

E
M1
where  is the discount factor, k a parameter of sensitivity of the electorate
to the majority's behavior in period 1 and E
M1
is the stake of winning the
election, that is, the dierence between the welfare of a type 1 agent with
majority 1 in power and his welfare with majority 2 in power.
15
Assuming that V (d) =
1
2
d
2
, we can solve for the choice of majority 1 in
period 1. We obtain
b
d
1
= d
1
= (1 + ) = d

and
b
d
1
= d

+
d
1
  d

1 + kE
M1
where d
1
is given by (1) and d

by (3). Similarly for majority 2, we obtain
b
d
2
= d
2
= (1 + ) = d

and
b
d
2
= d

+
d
2
  d

1 + kE
M2
14
Note that d
1
= d

.
15
E
M1
= W
M1;D
(d
1
; d
1
) W
M1;D
(d
2
; d
2
) and E
M2
= W
M2;D
(d
2
; d
2
) W
M2;D
(d
1
; d
1
)
where d
1
= d
2
= (1 + ), d
1
is given by (1) and d
2
is given by (2).
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where d
2
is given by (2).
The expected rst period social welfare under reelection considerations
is given by
E

c
W
D
=
1
2
E

W
D
1
(
b
d
1
;
b
d
1
) +
1
2
E

W
D
2
(
b
d
2
;
b
d
2
)
where
b
d
1
=
b
d
2
= (1 + ) as before. In the case of social pooling of section
(3.4), nothing is changed when reelection considerations are raised since
politicians have no role and expected social welfare is given by
E

W
P
(d
p
)
with d
p
obtained from (7). We can now illustrate the fact that in a situation
calling originally for pooling (condition (8) satised and  or k equal to
0), the greater sensitivity of the electorate to excessive pursuit of private
agendas and the greater desire of politicians to remain in power (positive 
and k and increasing  or k) lead to the emergence of incentive mechanisms
[See Figure 3 for an example]. Indeed, for  or k large enough, the social
welfare superiority of political discrimination over pooling appears.
[Figure 3 here]
In this context, the emergence of sophisticated incentive mechanisms
would therefore be associated with increases in , the desire of politicians
to remain in power over time, and increases in k, the greater dislike by the
electorate of excessive pursuit of private agendas.
5 REELECTION CONSTRAINTS AND MUL-
TIPLE PRIVATELY INFORMED INTEREST
GROUPS
In the previous sections we have seen how the delegation to politicians of
economic policy (here the choice of incentive mechanisms) enables them to
distribute informational rents to interest groups. In this section we want
to explore the extent to which competing interest groups may mitigate the
distortions in the allocation of resources that politicians might nd prof-
itable. For this purpose, we extend the model by also introducing asymmet-
ric information about the damages of pollution. In the same way as  is
private information of producers, the disutility of pollution is now V (d) for
 2 f; g, with  =   and  = Prob(). The parameter  is private in-
formation of the environmentalists. Environmentalists (type 1 agents) have
14
now obtained to be compensated and their utility level is
U
1
= s   V (d)
where s is the transfer from the government. The producers (type 2 agents)
have now utility:
U
2
= t  (K   d)
and taxpayers who are now distinct from producers and environmentalists
have utility:
U
3
= S   (1 + )(t+ s):
Utilitarian social welfare is
W = U
1
+ U
2
+ U
3
= S   (1 + ) ((K   d) + V (d))  (U
1
+ U
2
):
Under complete information the optimal pollution is characterized now
16
by V
0
(d) = . Under incomplete information a revelation mechanism is
now a triple fd(; ), t(; ), s(; )g. The relevant incentive and individual
rationality constraints are:
E

ft(; )  (K   d(; ))g  E

ft(; )  (K   d(; ))g
E

ft(; )  (K   d(; ))g  0
E

fs(; )  V (d(; ))g  E

fs(; )  V (d(; ))g
E

fs(; )  V (d(; ))g  0
Since the individual rationality constraints are binding, the expected rents
for the type- producer and type- environmentalist are
U
2
= E

(K   d(; ))
U
1
= E

V (d(; )):
Substituting in the social welfare function we obtain:
W
D
(
 !
d ) = E
;
W = [S   (1 + )((K   d(; )) + V (d(; )))]
+(1  )[S   (1 + )((K   d(; )) + V (d(; )))]
+(1  )[S   (1 + )((K   d(; )) + V (d(; )))]
+(1  )(1  )[S   (1 + )((K   d(; )) + V (d(; )))]
 [(K   d(; )) + (1  )(K   d(; ))]
 [V (d(; )) + (1  )V (d(; ))]
16
Having an individual rationality constraint for the environmentalists amounts to as-
suming that they are indemnied at a social cost of (1 + ). This is why we obtain now
V
0
(d) =  instead of V
0
(d) = (1 + ).
15
with
 !
d =

d(; ); d(; ); d(; ); d(; )

:
Assuming Bayesian Nash behavior of producers and environmentalists,
the revelation mechanism which maximizes social welfare under incentive
and individual rationality constraints is characterized by
16
V
0
(d(; )) = 

 +

1 + 

1  


V
0
(d(; )) = 
V
0
(d(; )) =  +

1 + 

1  


 +

1 + 

1  


V
0
(d(; )) =  +

1 + 

1  
:
That is, with V (d) =
1
2
d
2
,
d(; ) = 
 1
d(; ) = 

 +

1 + 

1  


 1
d(; ) =

 +

1 + 

1  



 1
d(; ) =

 +

1 + 

1  


 +

1 + 

1  


 1
:
Let us assume that the two interest groups use a share of their in-
formational rent as campaign contributions to inuence politicians. We
consider as in section 4 a two period model. In period 2, the majority
1 is able to favor the interests of environmentalists by maximizing, with
 !
d
1
=

d
1
(; ); d
1
(; ); d
1
(; ); d
1
(; )

,
W
M1;D
(
 !
d
1
) = E
;
[S   (1 + )((K   d) + V (d))]  U
1
  (1 + )U
2
;
that is, by not including in its objective function the rent of the producers.
This results in a second period regulation characterized by:
V
0
(d
1
(; )) = 

 +

1 + 

1  


V
0
(d
1
(; )) = 
V
0
(d
1
(; )) =  +

1  


 +

1 + 

1  


V
0
(d
1
(; )) =  +

1  
:
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Similarly, if elected, majority 2 maximizes, with
 !
d
2
=

d
2
(; ); d
2
(; ); d
2
(; ); d
2
(; )

,
W
M2;D
(
 !
d
2
) = E
;
[S   (1 + )((K   d) + V (d))]  (1 + )U
1
  U
2
yielding a second period regulation characterized by:
V
0
(d
2
(; )) = 

 +

1  


V
0
(d
2
(; )) = 
V
0
(d
2
(; )) =  +

1 + 

1  


 +

1  


V
0
(d
2
(; )) =  +

1 + 

1  
:
The stake of winning the election for period 2 is now, for majority 1,
E
M1
= W
M1;D
(
 !
d
1
) W
M1;D
(
 !
d
2
)
and, for majority 2,
E
M2
= W
M2;D
(
 !
d
2
) W
M2;D
(
 !
d
1
)
where
W
M1;D
() = W
D
()  U
2
W
M2;D
() = W
D
()  U
1
with obvious notations.
Let us assume that each majority makes campaign contributions C
1
and
C
2
which are xed proportions , assumed equal for both majorities, of their
average rents, that is,
C
1
= U
1
C
2
= U
2
with
U
1
= [V (d(; )) + (1  )V (d(; ))]
U
2
= [(K   d(; )) + (1  )(K   d(; ))]
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These campaign contributions aect the probability of winning the elec-
tion that follows.For majority 1, the probability of winning is assumed to
be:
	 =
1
2
+
1
2
g(U
1
  U
2
)
where g is a parameter representing the importance of campaign contribu-
tions in the electoral process. Majority 1 maximizes
W
M1;D
(
 !
b
d
1
) + 	E
M1
(
 !
b
d
1
)
leading to
V
0
(
b
d
1
(; )) = 
 
 +

1 + 

1  
  
1
2
E
M1
g
(1 + )(1  )
!
V
0
(
b
d
1
(; )) = 
V
0
(
b
d
1
(; )) =  +

1  
 +
1
2
E
M1
g
(1 + )(1  )
 
 +

1 + 

1  
  
1
2
E
M1
g
(1 + )(1  )
!
V
0
(
b
d
1
(; )) =  +

1  
 +
1
2
E
M1
g
(1 + )(1  )
:
Let
 !
b
d
1
=

b
d
1
(; );
b
d
1
(; );
b
d
1
(; );
b
d
1
(; )

. In comparison with the
static case, the environmentalists majority increases the pollution levels in
all cases, except in the case (; ). The reason is that it was before only
interested in decreasing the producers' rent (with respect to the social op-
timum) because it undervalued this rent in its objective function. Now, in
addition, it wishes to increase further its own rent in order to increase its
probability of winning the election through its campaign contributions and
furthermore it wishes to decrease even further the producers' rent for the
same reason.
We obtain symmetric results for the producers' majority:
V
0
(
b
d
2
(; )) = 
 
 +

1  
 +
1
2
E
M2
g
(1 + )(1  )
!
V
0
(
b
d
2
(; )) = 
V
0
(
b
d
2
(; )) =  +

1 + 

1  
  
1
2
E
M2
g
(1 + )(1  )
 
 +

1 + 

1  
 +
1
2
E
M2
g
(1 + )(1  )
!
V
0
(
b
d
2
(; )) =  +

1  
  
1
2
E
M2
g
(1 + )(1  )
:
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Let
 !
b
d
2
=

b
d
2
(; );
b
d
2
(; );
b
d
2
(; );
b
d
2
(; )

: In comparison with the
static case, the producers majority decreases the pollution levels in all cases,
except in the case (; ). The reason is similar that for which the environ-
mentalists were increasing the pollution levels. Recalling the social welfare
function W = U
1
+ U
2
+ U
3
, let
E

c
W
D
=
1
2
E

W
D
(
 !
b
d
1
) +
1
2
E

W
D
(
 !
b
d
2
):
The above discriminatory mechanism is to be compared with a pooling
mechanism which restrict the choice of each majority to a unique pollution
level (varying with ) irrespective of the particular values of  and . We
have:
W
P
(d) = S   (1 + )

( + (1  ))(K   d) + ( + (1  ))V (d)

 V (d)  (K   d)
yielding, with V (d) =
1
2
d
2
,
d
p
=
 + (1  ) +

1 + 

 + (1  ) +

1 + 

The desire to use powerful incentive schemes leads now to two types
of additional distortions. First, campaign contributions are losses from a
welfare point of view and second, eciency distortions are reinforced. In a
situation where pooling is dominated in the static case, we may expect for
g,  or  large enough the domination of pooling [See Figure 4A, 4B and 4C
for an example].
[Figure 4A here]
[Figure 4B here]
[Figure 4C here]
In this context, the emergence of sophisticated incentive mechanisms
would therefore be associated with decreases in , the desire of politicians
to remain in power over time, decreases in g, the importance of campaign
contributions in the electoral process and decreases in , the willingness of
agents to make campaign contributions out of their informational rents. The
presence of multiple interest groups may transform valuable reforms towards
20
incentive mechanisms into undesirable reforms: these mechanisms raise the
stake of political conicts generating other distortions.
17
6 CONCLUSION
We have interpreted the political economy of environmental policy as an
analysis of the economic implications of politicians' discretion in pursuing
the private agendas of their electoral base: some voters are more concerned
than others by pollution, some voters have stakes in the rents of the polluting
rms.
Sophisticated environmental policy is dependent on non veriable vari-
ables which cannot be contracted upon in the constitution. Consequently it
must be delegated to politicians, creating an incentive problem when politi-
cians' motivations are to stay in power by pleasing a majority of voters and
not to maximize social welfare. We have studied in this paper the severity
of this incentive problem. We have shown that the larger the social cost
of public funds is (larger E) and the greater the variability of economic
variables (V ar(), , ) is, the more valuable exibility is and therefore
the greater the delegation of authority to politicians should be. However,
the thinner majorities are (the lower 

is) or the larger the informational
rents are (the larger  and/or the larger  are), the more the politicians'
objectives are biased away from social welfare, providing a justication of
cruder environmental policies which leave them less discretion.
Reelection considerations lead to conicting inuences on this basic trade-
o. If, through reputation eects and a better social control (a larger k),
pursuing excessively private agendas today is costly for the next election,
more sophisticated environmental policies may emerge as socially optimal.
On the contrary, if the campaign contributions favoring reelection are im-
portant (larger g) and signicantly related (larger ) to the informational
rents of the various interest groups, politicians are led to greater distortions
to favor even more the interest groups supporting them. When this is added
to the waste of campaign contributions themselves, it favors giving up so-
phisticated policies which become costly political stakes. Depending on the
relative importance of these conicting eects of reelection considerations,
a longer term view in politics (larger ) favors (if the k-eect dominates the
combined g-eect and -eect) or not (otherwise) the emergence of sophis-
ticated market based or incentive mechanisms.
17
This negative eect should be combined with the positive reputation eect of section 4.
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A APPENDIX 1
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Consider rst the case of social pooling. From the envelop theorem,
dW
P
d
=  [E+ (1  )(1 +E)](K   d
p
) < 0 (9)
From the denition of d
p
in (4),
dd
p
d





=
=
1 + E  
(1  )V
00
(d
0
)
: (10)
We have
d
2
W
P
d
2





=
= (1 +E  )
dd
p
d





=
=
(E+ (1  ))
2
(1  )V
00
(d
0
)
=

2
+ 1  2 + 2(1  )E+ (E)
2
(1  )V
00
(d
0
)
: (11)
Consider now the case of discrimination. Social welfare when majority
1 decides, W
D
1
, can be written as
W
D
1
=
W
M1;D


+ (K   d
1
) (12)
where W
M1
is the objective function of majority 1. Using the envelope
theorem for W
M1
we have
dW
D
1
d
=  (1 +   )(K   d)  
dd
1
d
(13)
where from (1),
dd
1
d





=
=
1 + 
(1  )V
00
(d
0
)
(14)
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and therefore
d
2
W
D
1
d
2





=
=
(1 +   2)(1 + )
(1  )V
00
(d
0
)
(15)
Similarly, when majority 2 decides, we have
W
D
2
=
W
M2;D


+ (1 
1


)(K   d
2
)
yielding
dW
D
2
d
=  (1 +   )(K   d
2
)  (1 
1


)
dd
2
d
where from (2)
dd
2
d





=
=
1 +   =

(1  )V
00
(d
0
)
(16)
and therefore
d
2
W
D
2
d
2





=
=
(1 +   =

)
(1  )V
00
(d
0
)
(1 + +



  2): (17)
Hence the expected second derivative at  =  in case of discrimination
(assuming that each majority is in power half the time) is given by
d
2
E

W
D
d
2





=
=

2
 


 
1
2

2
!
+ 1  2 + 2(1  )E+ (E)
2
+ V ar()
(1  )V
00
(d
0
)
:
(18)
The comparison of second derivatives at  =  as given by (11) and (18)
shows the domination of political discrimination (through a larger second
derivative at  = ) i
"
V ar() + 
2
 


 
1
2

2
!#
> 
2
that is, i
V ar() > v

(; 

)  
2
 

2
  

+
1
2

2
!
> 0:
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
We study now the constitutional choice from the point of view of each ma-
jority. Consider rst majority 1. Its welfare under the current pooling
mechanism is:
W
M1;P
(d
p
; d
p
) = 

h
[S   V (d
p
)  (1 +E) (K   d
p
)  (1 + E)(K   d
p
)]
+ (1  ) [S   (1 + E)(K   d
p
)  V (d
p
)]
i
= 

W
P
(d
p
; d
p
)  



K   d
p

Hence, using the envelop theorem,
dW
M1;P
d
= 

@W
P
@
  



K   d
p

+ 


dd
p
d
d
2
W
M1;P
d
2





=
= 

d
2
W
P
d
2
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Its welfare under the discriminatory mechanism if it has the majority is :
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and therefore, using (14),
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Its welfare if majority 2 holds is
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by making use of (16). Comparing the two institutions ex ante on a per
capita basis, majority 1 prefers the discriminatory mechanism i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which may be positive or negative.
Consider now majority 2. We obtain in a similar way the following
expressions under the pooling mechanism:
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Its welfare under the discriminatory mechanism when it has the majority is:
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by using (14). Its welfare if majority 1 holds is
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by using the envelop theorem and (14). Comparing the two institutions ex
ante on a per capita basis, majority 2 prefers the discriminatory mechanism
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B APPENDIX 2
B.1 Proof of Proposition 3
In the case of majority 1 we obtain from (5) and (6)
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Hence the expected second derivative at  =  in the above case of pooling
mechanism (assuming again that each majority is in power half the time) is
given by
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(21)
Therefore, the second derivative of the expected social welfare under the
pooling mechanism is (1   ) times the second derivative of the expected
social welfare under the discriminatory mechanism as given by (18). Those
derivatives are of the same sign but may be positive or negative. If H() is
negative [positive], those derivatives are negative [positive] and therefore the
pooling mechanism [the discriminatory mechanism] dominates for  close to
.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 4
The second derivative of the expected social welfare under the full discrim-
inatory mechanism is given by (18). For the social pooling mechanism con-
sidered here, we have
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Comparing (18) and (22), we obtain that the current pooling mechanism
dominates for  small enough i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